Living with Competing Interests: Integrity and Plurality
Simon Robinson
The debate about scientific academic freedom tends to be focused in the defence of this freedom against commercial interests. The broad argument runs that if commercial interests dominate research, then the core elements of scientific freedom will be lost. Much of the thinking around the concept of academic and scientific freedom has been dominated by Merton (1); this involves four scientific norms:
Communism, defined in terms of sharing methods of teaching and research progress and findings. This is contrasted with the argument that rights over intellectual property should restrict access to such material.
Universalism, defined in terms of scientific knowledge transcending the interests of politics, commerce, or religion. The law of gravity, for instance, cannot be altered by political or commercial interest.
Disinterestedness, involving a lack of emotional or financial attachments to research. This is essentially teleological, in that it focuses on the core purpose of research, deemed to be the pursuit of truth. It ties in with broader discussions about professions and their task to pursue key moral or pre-moral goods, such as justice (the law) or health and well being (medicine) (2).
Organized scepticism, involving a critical approach to all research. At one level, this involves caution about results until they clearly establish facts. At another level, this implies a community of practice that can never fully expound the truth.
These are powerful values that still resonate. They provide a view that science is in essence a moral activity, with a core aim of pursuing the truth. The underlying narrative, however, is contested. First, the history of scientific institutions, and particularly universities, has always involved interests that were not “purely” scientific. Research has never been free of “interests.” The key is not simply for research to be disinterested, but rather to know how to handle the other interests involved. Second, competing interests are embodied even within universities. There has always been competition among academics for funding, reputation, and individual or disciplinary success (3). This suggests another, more fragmented, view of research practice, questioning Mertonian communism. Even when the research is subject to peer scrutiny, this is not value free. The idea that science is a “pure” lens through which we see the truth ignores the fact that “truth” is assessed and understood in the light of broader, often competing, values. Third, against the Merton norms lies the cold hard reality of resources. While these norms are important to maintain, the freedom to research does not bring with it automatically the right to research funding.
Hence, placed alongside the Mertonian norms are other contrasting values that do not necessarily conflict. Alongside disinterestedness may well be interestedness. The scientist has an interest in the sustainability of his institution or related centers. Alongside communism, there is individual achievement. Alongside organized scepticism, there is the value of care and commitment, without which there would not be an academic community. Alongside universalism, there is respect for disciplinarity and application. The argument so far then suggests that there is a false polarization in much of the competing interest debate that does not take account of the complexity of science, business, or politics. Underlying the “interest groups” are a number of core ethical values, including freedom, critical dialogue, accountability, and sustainability. None of these “belong” to any one group, and indeed, form the basis for testing business, politics, and science. The ethical identity of science involves both the search for truth and social responsibility, and both are subject to critical debate (4). In turn, this puts the stress more on responsibility than “interest,” and critical reflection on the plural responsibilities of science, politics, and business. In the light of this, the very term “competing interests” seems insufficient. Beneath any interest lies a view of purpose, ethical values, ethical identity, and responsibilities in relation to the social and physical environment. Without an articulation of this meaning it is difficult in practice to see just what the “interest” involves and quite how it may be addressed. The real question is how we deal with the plurality, and how these different groups might begin to engage in meaningful dialogue in this area.
The stress on plurality can sometimes lead to intellectual hyperventilation. After all, doesn’t plural responsibility lead to ethical relativity and in the end to great confusion? At this point it is important not to panic. First, there is a moral and practical argument for plural responsibilities and related perspectives. At one level this is about recognizing the truth that differences exist. Second, and connected, the polarized thinking betrays a strong ad hominem dynamic. Business, for instance, is seen as, by definition, wrong. This involves assumptions about motive and practice and leads to a level of discussion that does not critically analyze ideas, values, or practice. This can lead to false identification of ethical issues. A third reason not to panic is that focusing on difference, through plural responsibilities, does not require different ethical frameworks. On the contrary, it is possible to work through different responsibilities in relation even to one or two shared principles. Fourth, this involves a complex view of integrity. Integrity is often seen as the individual standing up for moral principles. However, integrity is much more complex, involving self-integration, integrative thinking, commitment, consistency, relational awareness, identity, and responsibility (5, 6).
In short then, the ethical discussion underlying the competing interests debate cannot be addressed by simplistic resort to either deontological ethics (focused on principles) or utilitarian ethics (focused on consequences). It requires an ethics that is both able to stand out for core general principles and also able to handle plural responsibilities and perspectives, and practice related virtues. Central to this is the discipline of critical dialogue focused in practice. Minimally, this involves knowing who is involved in the dialogue with clarity about associations and thus links to stakeholders. Hence, competing interests should be declared. This is well illustrated by the Format for Disclosure of Competing Interests set out by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE),
“We ask authors to disclose 4 types of information.
- First, their associations with commercial entities that provided support for the work reported in the submitted manuscript (the time frame for disclosure in this section of the form is the life span of the work being reported).
- Second, their associations with commercial entities that could be viewed as having an interest in the general area of the submitted manuscript (the time frame for disclosure in this section is the 36 months before submission of the manuscript).
- Third, any similar financial associations involving their spouse or their children under 18 years of age.
- Fourth, nonfinancial associations that may be relevant to the submitted manuscript” (7, p. 125).
This enables all readers to see the web of relationships the author is involved in, and in particular any that might influence judgment. It focuses on commercial, family, or any other interest (which might include campaigning or charity roles related to the subject). None of these disqualify any paper. On the contrary, the paper will be judged by peers on the same criteria applicable to any academic piece of work. If there are commercial or ideological interests in this research, it is certainly not in the interest of either to hide research or to allow bad research through.
In some cases, it is important to establish a framework for critical dialogue. At its best, this could involve mutual critique of the core purposes of the different stakeholders through particular cases. Dialogue of this nature also begins to establish responsibility of the different interest groups. The different parties have to give a clear account of their values and practice. This also increases the sense of accountability to the stakeholders, with clear means of accounting in place. It also develops a sense of shared responsibility, from which emerges negotiation about how responsibility would be shared, such as the writing of the code, the financing of the project, and so on. The focus then moves to a disciplined attempt to identify core issues and create means of addressing them together.
The issue of competing interests is most often framed in terms of powerful forces, financial, political, or ideological, negatively influencing the proper purpose of practices. I have argued that care needs to be taken not to characterize this as a polarized debate; there are competing values even within sectors and industries and these are connected to the plural responsibilities not just of science, but also related professions, corporations, political leaders, and so on. This takes the debate away from sterile arguments about competing interests into a more subtle one of how we deal with competing values that are a core part of human experience. Beneath “interests” are values, worldviews, and practice that have to be critically engaged to reveal core ethical issues such as fraud, deceit, and manipulation or coercion. Critical engagement will stand out against these and look to hold together core values such as freedom, equality, sustainability, and justice. This demands a disciplined framework of critical dialogue, so that the different values of stakeholders can be appreciated, and ways can be found to fulfill the plural responsibilities within and between different groups.
References:
1. Merton, T. K. The normative structure of science. In: Storer, N., ed. The Sociology of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942:267-268
2. Airaksinen, T. Service and science in professional life. In: Chadwick, R., ed. Ethics and the Professions. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994:1-13.
3. Bender, T. From academic knowledge to democratic knowledge. In: Robinson, S., Katulushi, C., eds. Values in Higher Education. Cardiff: Aureus, 2005:51-64.
4. Scott, P. (2003). The ethical implications of the new research paradigm. Sci Eng Ethics,9, 73-84.
5. Gosling, M., & Huang, H. (2009). The fitbetween integrity and integrative social contracts theory. Journal of Business Ethics,90, 407-417.
6. Institute of Chartered Accountancy in England and Wales. (2007). Reporting with integrity. London.
7. Drazen, J. M., Van Der Weyden, M. B., Sahni, P., Rosenberg, J., Marusic, A., Laine, C., et al. (2010). Uniform format for disclosure of competing interests in ICMJE journals. Ann Intern Med,152, 125-126.